Working Paper #1--Post 74th CA Urban Governance: An Ethnographic Case Study of a Mumbai Ward
Excerpt from Introduction:
. . .Again, while most development thinkers and practitioners attach an almost intrinsic value to democratic decentralization and the NDSs, some voices are emerging which acknowledge that the existence of NDSs does not ipso facto make for pro-poor poverty reducing regimes (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001, Williams 2004). Essentially, some have begun to reign in the enthusiasm for decentralization reforms by reminding us that it is not an end in itself, but rather one mechanism (among others) theorized to aid poverty reduction, to improve administrative efficiency, reduce corruption and discrimination, and to deepen democracy by increasing participation and accountability (Bardhan and Mookherhee, 2005; Silverman 2000; Johnson et al. 2005). As such, more research is needed to determine which forms of governance networks best serve the interests of the poor and mitigate against exclusionary practices and capture by elite interests (Baud 2004). Also, approaches to democratic decentralization tend to ignore that poor already act as political agents and participate in processes which affect their livelihoods—it is just that at present they more often act as clients participating in clientalist institutions, which they see as being better able to provide temporary security, rather than as citizens in democratic spaces willing and able to trade short-term security for long-term goals of equality and full citizenship rights (Taylor 2004). Presently, little is known as to what extent participatory decentralized governance reduces the practice of this survival tactic of what Geof Wood (2003) calls the “Faustian Bargain”: “the trade-off between the freedom to act independently in the pursuit of improved livelihoods and the necessity of dependent security” (455). The box below lists the theorized positive outcomes and the reasons for failure of these to develop on the ground. The italicized entries are those which my case study data deals with.
Based on my review of the relevant literature pertaining to democratic decentralization, the majority of research and writings focus primarily on the normative roles and responsibilities of the various governance actors. These writings are too often based upon ideas of democratization, decentralization, participation, and citizen empowerment which are accepted with little or no critical engagement as to how they go with the local context let alone if they are always the best route to greater and more equitable development. Also, too little work has focused on the urban arena. This article will attempt to expand the debate by offering an ethnographic account of the democratic decentralized governance of one Mumbai Administrative Ward, which for the sake of anonymity I will call Ward X.[1] A Mumbai Ward offers an excellent case through which to see developments since the advent of formal democratic decentralization, as India’s 74th Constitutional Amendment[2] , called for greater decentralization of money and powers to urban local bodies and mandated the inclusion of women and scheduled tribes and casts (via seat reservation). Specifically, the 74th CA laid out the path for urban decentralization by giving constitutional status to local bodies and thereby creating a NDS.[3] This NDS includes local level elected ward councillors (WCs), ward bureaucrats (WBs), and three registered civil society organizations (CSOs) representatives referred to as selected ward councillors (SWCs) in the form of Ward Committees. The 74th CA also mandated that seats be reserved in ward committees for women and backward castes to ensure comprehensive representation. The diagram below illustrates how this NDS, according to the policy and the theories behind it, is supposed to work. It is important to note that citizen participation is indirect and their interests are thought to be represented by both WCs and CSOs.
The job now is to determine if this type of NDS: “provides the poor with an effective way of making their priorities known” in order for their livelihoods to be strengthened (Baud 2004, p.14) and for accountability to be fostered and why or why not. This paper lends itself to this important endeavor, by taking a close look at what is occurring on the ground in the sphere of Mumbai ward governance by focusing primarily but not exclusively on Ward Councilors (WCs)[4] and their governance activities, interactions and networks. I choose to look at post 74th CA ward governance primarily via the prism of WCs as they operate in both the city’s formal and informal governance institutions, they are the elected official with whom the poor have the closest proximity to, and they were the stakeholder most empowered by the 74th CA. Thus, they are a good point of engagement through which to explore this issue ethnographically to discover how post 74th CA governance seems to be operating in general. In addition to rich description of ward governance, this case allows me to engage the debate as to whether policies like these in Mumbai have thus far resulted in: improved governance, poverty reduction, citizen empowerment, and deepened the democratization of society.
_______Footnotes_______________________
[1] This analysis is based upon the three months I spent studying this Ward which included: many in-depth interviews with pertinent formal governance actors (13 out of the 14 Ward Councillors (WCs), 4 Ward Officers, 1 Selected Ward Councillor , 3 Mahila Mandals, and 3 NGOs) WC network analysis, informal discussions (with various ward employees, slum dwellers, WC associates, and other random citizen encounters) participant observation of WCs interaction with other administrators, WCs, contractor/developers, and their constituents), secondary document analysis, and ward budget analysis. Ward X is responsible for delivering city level civic amenities to a population of that of a large city--798,775 (as of 2001 census) in an area of 19.13 square km. Its operating budget of 2004-05 was 16 crores (160 Million Rupees/3 Million Euros) which works out to be about 200 rupees per person (a little less then 4 euros) and they have requested a budget of 30 crores for 2005-2006 At present, Ward X’s slum population is estimated to be around 45%. There are 15 electoral wards and each WC is to represent approximately 60,000 people. The electoral wards here are quite an eclectic group. The range from electoral wards with mainly formal housing and occupied by mostly lower-upper middle-class residents, to electoral ward 7 which only has 8 formal structures and occupied by many tribal and fisherman colonies from Gujarat, to electoral wards 1 and 4 which are almost completely slums, to electoral ward 9 which is almost completely Muslim.[1] Of course, there are also areas within many of the electoral wards that have new movie cinemas, expensive restaurants, and mini-malls. It’s in many ways a microcosm of the diversity of Greater Mumbai.
[2] India, like numerous other countries, moved from centralization to decentralization in line with the emergent popularized ideas of good governance discussed above. The two aims of the 74th CA—reservation and decentralization—are intertwined in that both are seen as necessary for the efficient and democratic handling of urbanization issues.[2] If such issues as poverty, discrimination, overpopulation, water, sanitation, and infrastructure inadequacies are to be dealt with more effectively and efficiently then local government needs to have greater jurisdiction and be more representative of the population. These more representative and empowered Urban Local Bodies are believed to be better positioned to deal with local issues because of their daily lived proximity to these pressing urban issues and because of their close proximity and thus greater accountability to citizens. The main aims of the 74th CA are: to set up institutional mechanisms to facilitate decentralization, to demarcate the role of Urban Local Bodies and specify their functions, to ensure that representation of all sections of society (women, backward castes and tribes, and registered Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), to recommend the setting up of Ward Committees in regions within the city limits with three or more lakhs[2] people to facilitate democratic decentralization within cities as well as between them and their state, and to ensure that local bodies are not superseded by state governments (RCUES 2004, p.7).
[3] Even though the private sector is not included it does include formal CSO participation and does work to bring representatives closer to the people in an attempt to strengthen citizen voice and thus can be considered a NDS.
[4] Each of Mumbai’s administrative wards is broken down into electoral wards (of approximately 60,000) for each electoral ward a Ward Councilor is elected to represent the citizens of that ward at both the ward level in ward committees and at the city level in the legislative wing of the Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation. The 74th Constitutional Amendment increased the scope of this elected position.
. . .Again, while most development thinkers and practitioners attach an almost intrinsic value to democratic decentralization and the NDSs, some voices are emerging which acknowledge that the existence of NDSs does not ipso facto make for pro-poor poverty reducing regimes (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001, Williams 2004). Essentially, some have begun to reign in the enthusiasm for decentralization reforms by reminding us that it is not an end in itself, but rather one mechanism (among others) theorized to aid poverty reduction, to improve administrative efficiency, reduce corruption and discrimination, and to deepen democracy by increasing participation and accountability (Bardhan and Mookherhee, 2005; Silverman 2000; Johnson et al. 2005). As such, more research is needed to determine which forms of governance networks best serve the interests of the poor and mitigate against exclusionary practices and capture by elite interests (Baud 2004). Also, approaches to democratic decentralization tend to ignore that poor already act as political agents and participate in processes which affect their livelihoods—it is just that at present they more often act as clients participating in clientalist institutions, which they see as being better able to provide temporary security, rather than as citizens in democratic spaces willing and able to trade short-term security for long-term goals of equality and full citizenship rights (Taylor 2004). Presently, little is known as to what extent participatory decentralized governance reduces the practice of this survival tactic of what Geof Wood (2003) calls the “Faustian Bargain”: “the trade-off between the freedom to act independently in the pursuit of improved livelihoods and the necessity of dependent security” (455). The box below lists the theorized positive outcomes and the reasons for failure of these to develop on the ground. The italicized entries are those which my case study data deals with.
Based on my review of the relevant literature pertaining to democratic decentralization, the majority of research and writings focus primarily on the normative roles and responsibilities of the various governance actors. These writings are too often based upon ideas of democratization, decentralization, participation, and citizen empowerment which are accepted with little or no critical engagement as to how they go with the local context let alone if they are always the best route to greater and more equitable development. Also, too little work has focused on the urban arena. This article will attempt to expand the debate by offering an ethnographic account of the democratic decentralized governance of one Mumbai Administrative Ward, which for the sake of anonymity I will call Ward X.[1] A Mumbai Ward offers an excellent case through which to see developments since the advent of formal democratic decentralization, as India’s 74th Constitutional Amendment[2] , called for greater decentralization of money and powers to urban local bodies and mandated the inclusion of women and scheduled tribes and casts (via seat reservation). Specifically, the 74th CA laid out the path for urban decentralization by giving constitutional status to local bodies and thereby creating a NDS.[3] This NDS includes local level elected ward councillors (WCs), ward bureaucrats (WBs), and three registered civil society organizations (CSOs) representatives referred to as selected ward councillors (SWCs) in the form of Ward Committees. The 74th CA also mandated that seats be reserved in ward committees for women and backward castes to ensure comprehensive representation. The diagram below illustrates how this NDS, according to the policy and the theories behind it, is supposed to work. It is important to note that citizen participation is indirect and their interests are thought to be represented by both WCs and CSOs.
The job now is to determine if this type of NDS: “provides the poor with an effective way of making their priorities known” in order for their livelihoods to be strengthened (Baud 2004, p.14) and for accountability to be fostered and why or why not. This paper lends itself to this important endeavor, by taking a close look at what is occurring on the ground in the sphere of Mumbai ward governance by focusing primarily but not exclusively on Ward Councilors (WCs)[4] and their governance activities, interactions and networks. I choose to look at post 74th CA ward governance primarily via the prism of WCs as they operate in both the city’s formal and informal governance institutions, they are the elected official with whom the poor have the closest proximity to, and they were the stakeholder most empowered by the 74th CA. Thus, they are a good point of engagement through which to explore this issue ethnographically to discover how post 74th CA governance seems to be operating in general. In addition to rich description of ward governance, this case allows me to engage the debate as to whether policies like these in Mumbai have thus far resulted in: improved governance, poverty reduction, citizen empowerment, and deepened the democratization of society.
_______Footnotes_______________________
[1] This analysis is based upon the three months I spent studying this Ward which included: many in-depth interviews with pertinent formal governance actors (13 out of the 14 Ward Councillors (WCs), 4 Ward Officers, 1 Selected Ward Councillor , 3 Mahila Mandals, and 3 NGOs) WC network analysis, informal discussions (with various ward employees, slum dwellers, WC associates, and other random citizen encounters) participant observation of WCs interaction with other administrators, WCs, contractor/developers, and their constituents), secondary document analysis, and ward budget analysis. Ward X is responsible for delivering city level civic amenities to a population of that of a large city--798,775 (as of 2001 census) in an area of 19.13 square km. Its operating budget of 2004-05 was 16 crores (160 Million Rupees/3 Million Euros) which works out to be about 200 rupees per person (a little less then 4 euros) and they have requested a budget of 30 crores for 2005-2006 At present, Ward X’s slum population is estimated to be around 45%. There are 15 electoral wards and each WC is to represent approximately 60,000 people. The electoral wards here are quite an eclectic group. The range from electoral wards with mainly formal housing and occupied by mostly lower-upper middle-class residents, to electoral ward 7 which only has 8 formal structures and occupied by many tribal and fisherman colonies from Gujarat, to electoral wards 1 and 4 which are almost completely slums, to electoral ward 9 which is almost completely Muslim.[1] Of course, there are also areas within many of the electoral wards that have new movie cinemas, expensive restaurants, and mini-malls. It’s in many ways a microcosm of the diversity of Greater Mumbai.
[2] India, like numerous other countries, moved from centralization to decentralization in line with the emergent popularized ideas of good governance discussed above. The two aims of the 74th CA—reservation and decentralization—are intertwined in that both are seen as necessary for the efficient and democratic handling of urbanization issues.[2] If such issues as poverty, discrimination, overpopulation, water, sanitation, and infrastructure inadequacies are to be dealt with more effectively and efficiently then local government needs to have greater jurisdiction and be more representative of the population. These more representative and empowered Urban Local Bodies are believed to be better positioned to deal with local issues because of their daily lived proximity to these pressing urban issues and because of their close proximity and thus greater accountability to citizens. The main aims of the 74th CA are: to set up institutional mechanisms to facilitate decentralization, to demarcate the role of Urban Local Bodies and specify their functions, to ensure that representation of all sections of society (women, backward castes and tribes, and registered Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), to recommend the setting up of Ward Committees in regions within the city limits with three or more lakhs[2] people to facilitate democratic decentralization within cities as well as between them and their state, and to ensure that local bodies are not superseded by state governments (RCUES 2004, p.7).
[3] Even though the private sector is not included it does include formal CSO participation and does work to bring representatives closer to the people in an attempt to strengthen citizen voice and thus can be considered a NDS.
[4] Each of Mumbai’s administrative wards is broken down into electoral wards (of approximately 60,000) for each electoral ward a Ward Councilor is elected to represent the citizens of that ward at both the ward level in ward committees and at the city level in the legislative wing of the Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation. The 74th Constitutional Amendment increased the scope of this elected position.
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